

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: O.O., A MINOR	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
	:	PENNSYLVANIA
	:	
APPEAL OF: A.O., FATHER	:	
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	:	
	:	
	:	No. 516 MDA 2026

Appeal from the Order Entered March 12, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-22-DP-0000023-2026

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.A., A MINOR	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
	:	PENNSYLVANIA
	:	
APPEAL OF: A.O., FATHER	:	
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	:	No. 519 MDA 2026

Appeal from the Order Entered March 12, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-22-DP-0000024-2026

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.:

FILED OCTOBER 01, 2026

Father, A.O., appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Juvenile Division, adjudicating his 17-year-old daughter, O.O., and his 15-year-old son, C.A., (the Children) dependent and committing them to the custody of Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth (the Agency). Father challenges the adjudication of dependency and disposition on the grounds that the trial court failed to place

the statutorily required dependency and dispositional findings on the record and to state dispositional terms with specificity. Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts as follows:

On February 2, 2026, [the Agency] filed respective dependency petitions regarding each of the above-captioned [Children]. As grounds for initiating the dependency proceedings, the Agency averred that the [C]hildren [were] without proper parental care and control. In the petitions, the Agency raised the following allegations:

(1) O.O. [] was sixteen [] years of age at the time the dependency petitions were filed. C.A. [] was fifteen [] years of age at the time the petitions were filed.

(2) The mother of the [C]hildren is unknown and is believed to be in South Africa.

(3) The children's father is [A.O.].

[(4). It is alleged that [Children are] dependent pursuant to Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6302(1).¹]

(5) On January 30, 2026, the Agency received a Child Protective Services referral regarding physical abuse allegations within the home which listed [] Father[] as the alleged perpetrator.

(6) During the initial assessment, significant concerns arose regarding the safety and well[-]being of the [C]hildren. Disclosures were made of ongoing physical abuse in the home and fearfulness of returning to the home with [Father].

(7) [Father] has threatened to significantly harm the [C]hildren if disclosures were made and has refused to allow access to the [C]hildren. [Father] advised that the Agency is "evil" and is attempting to abduct the family. [Father]

¹ This paragraph is in both dependency petitions but was omitted from the trial court opinion. **Compare** Dependency Petition, O.O., 2/2/26, at 4; Dependency Petition, C.A., 2/2/26, at 4 **with** Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/26, at 2.

has refused to comply with the Agency and has been observed to act in an erratic manner.

(8) Due to the significant concerns for the safety of the [C]hildren within the home, the Agency obtained a verbal order from the [trial court;] however[, Father] has since withheld the [C]hildren in his home and will not provide access to the [C]hildren.

(9) It is contrary to the [C]hildren's health, safety, welfare, and best interests to remain in the home of [Father], and placement is necessary.

Following a shelter care hearing held on February 2, 2026, this court issued an order directing that the [C]hildren be placed into temporary care and custody of the Agency pending an [a]djudication and [d]isposition [] hearing. This [c]ourt also directed the Agency to initiate family finding efforts to locate and contact immediate and extended family members for the purpose of fostering connections with the [C]hildren.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/26, at 1–2 (citations to the record omitted; paragraphs renumbered to match dependency petition).

The trial court held an adjudicatory and dispositional hearing on March 9, 2026. At the hearing, O.O. testified to four instances of physical encounters with Father. First, she testified that, in January 2025, Father became upset over the way she washed up in the kitchen and punched her on the head, causing a bruise. **See** N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 9–10. When O.O. ran away to a corner, he punched her on her breast. **See id.** at 10.

Second, O.O. testified that the previous year, Father requested she bring him an extension cord. **See id.** at 11. When she set it down on his right side, he became upset because she did not place it on his left side and began to shout. **See id.** She apologized, moved the cord to his left side, and

left. **See id.** Father then told O.O. to lie down, which he does “every time he hits [her], he tells [her] to lie down or sit down so he can hit [her],” and began to punch, kick, and drag her as she screamed and held on to the doors to prevent him from dragging her out. **See id.** at 11, 13. Father told O.O. to stop screaming, because if the police came, he would kill her and then kill himself, and her brother would know that she was the reason they were both dead. **See id.** at 13. O.O. testified that she was trying to cover her face, and he told her to uncover her face for him to hit; when she did not, he continued to kick her. **See id.** at 14. He then brought out a belt with a silver buckle and silver cap and began hitting her with the metal side on her back, and later on her whole body. **See id.** at 14–15. O.O. said she felt blood on her back and knee. **See id.** Eventually, Father stopped hitting her with the belt and just hit her with his hands, punching, kicking, and stomping on her. **See id.** at 15. As a result of the incident, she sustained welts on her leg and knee. **See id.** at 17–19; Agency Exhibit 1 (O.O.’s video of injuries suffered during incident). She was unable to sleep afterward. **See** N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 15–16.

Third, O.O. testified that at some point in the past, Father asked her to make a list of potential colleges to attend but was unhappy with the way she did it and made her kneel while he gave her instructions. **See id.** at 19–20. He became angry when she said, “[O]h, my gosh” because her knees were bothering her, believing the statement was a response to his advice. **See id.** at 20. As a result, he got angry, punched her in the face, slapped her, and

hit her. **See id.** O.O. suffered a knot on her head and aches throughout her body from this incident. **See id.** at 20–21; Agency Exhibit 2 (O.O.’s video of injuries sustained during incident).

Finally, O.O. testified that, when she was approximately six or seven years old and living in South Africa, Father became angry at the Children because they were joking around at the dinner table and he said they would choke on their food. **See** N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 22. C.A. did choke, and Father got up to help him and gave him water. **See id.** O.O. then also choked, but instead of helping her, Father told her to stand up and hit and beat her with a wooden broom. **See id.** The beating continued until he broke the wooden broom on her back. **See id.**

The trial court further found:

O.O. stated that the specific incidents she recounted were not the only incidents where Father hit her. She recounted that over the last two years, Father’s beatings occurred “a lot of times[,]” and they seemed to be triggered by “the most random things.” She stated that[,] in general, she has never had a good relationship with Father because he has been hitting her since she was small. O.O. testified that Father is not a strict person overall and generally allows her to do things that a regular teenager does, but he tends to become angry and hit O.O. over seemingly trivial matters. O.O. stated that Father does not hit [C.A.] as much as he hits her. She recalled one incident where Father hit [C.A.] on the head because he had forgotten his coat while in a rush to get to church, but Father later apologized to [C.A.] for hitting him.

O.O. stated that she did not want to go back home with Father, even if there were proper measures put into place to assist in resolving any issues between the two of them.

At the [adjudicatory and dispositional] hearing, the Agency also presented the testimony of Child Protective Service Supervisor Larissa Langeheine. Langeheine confirmed that there are pending

criminal charges against Father arising out of the conduct alleged in the dependency petition. Langeheine conveyed that the Agency is generally concerned about Father's lack of engagement and cooperation with the Agency. When law enforcement and Agency caseworkers initially went to speak with Father at his home and to express their safety concerns about the [C]hildren, Father behaved evasively and erratically, and he refused to allow the caseworkers to lay eyes on the [C]hildren. Father also acted dismissively when he was informed that the Agency had obtained a verbal pickup order for the Children. Specifically, Father attempted to argue that the laws and policies of the United States do not apply to him since he is from South Africa, and he went inside his home and closed the door without allowing the caseworkers access to the home or the [C]hildren.

Because Father repeatedly refused to provide the caseworkers with access to his home, individuals from the Agency had to execute the verbal pickup order by going to the [C]hildren's school and picking them up from there. The [C]hildren are currently in formal foster care []. Langehaine testified that the Agency attempted to engage in family finding and made efforts to prevent the [C]hildren from being removed from their home, but they were unable to do so because Father consistently refused to engage with the Agency. Specifically, he refused to provide the necessary information and sign the necessary releases for family finding, and he has repeatedly claimed that he does not have to comply with the Agency's demands. Father has also been very recalcitrant about providing the Agency with the [C]hildren's medical and dental records, claiming that the Agency had no concern in seeing that information. The Agency has set up a schedule for supervised visitation between Father and the [C]hildren. According to Langheine, the first visit with the Children occurred at the Agency, but the interactions between Father and the [C]hildren were very inappropriate. During that visit, Father repeatedly blamed the [C]hildren for the situation he was in, and the visit was so uncomfortable that O.O. declined to complete the visitation. As a result of how poorly the visitation went, the Agency, instead of continuing with visits at the Agency, referred Father to weekly parenting classes to begin working on his parenting skills with the [C]hildren.

Langeheine testified that the Agency has established various service objectives for Father. Langeheine stated that she attempted to sit down with Father on one occasion to go over

these objectives, but Father became very agitated while she was trying to explain them to him.

Langeheine indicated that the Agency has concerns about Father potentially absconding with the [C]hildren based on several incidents and interactions. At one point, after the [C]hildren had been removed from Father's home, Father was arrested for trying to retrieve the [C]hildren from their school even after he was told that he was to have no contact with the [C]hildren without Agency supervision. Moreover, Father had expressed to Langeheine multiple times that if he is able to get his son, C.A., back into his home, he and C.A. are going to go back to South Africa, a sentiment which was also expressed by C.A. himself.

Langeheine's testimony established that[,] unlike O.O., C.A. would like to return to Father's home and that there was no evidence that C.A. was being physically abused by Father. However, based on Langeheine's discussions with C.A., she still has concerns about C.A. being placed back into Father's care. Aside from Father's threats to abscond to South Africa with C.A., C.A. has admitted that Father is abusive with O.O. and that Father has threatened to kill C.A. if he tells anyone about what Father did to O.O.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/26, at 6–9 (citations to record omitted).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court expressly found O.O.'s testimony credible. **See** N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 54. Based on O.O.'s testimony and the testimony of the Agency, the trial court found the Agency met its burden by clear and convincing evidence to substantiate the allegations in the petition and to adjudicate the Children dependent based on a lack of proper parental care and control. **See id.** at 54–55. Furthermore, the trial court found it would be contrary to the Children's welfare for them to remain in Father's home. **See id.** at 55. Finally, it concluded that the Agency's recommendations for Father were reasonable

in light of the Agency's knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the need for a psychological evaluation of Father. **See id.**

Father filed timely notices of appeal and contemporaneous concise statements of errors complained of on appeal on March 30, 2026 for both Children. **See** Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). He raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit an error of law when it failed to place its reasoning on the record or opinion when it adjudicated the [Children] dependent in its March 9, 2026 [o]rder?
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit an error of law when it failed to include the terms and conditions of the disposition, the services ordered, the validity of the permanency plan, the educational stability of the [C]hildren, and health care requirements?

Appellant's Brief, at 3.

Father argues,² first, that the trial court erred in failing to include specific factual findings in its order, as required by Pa.R.J.C.P. 1408 and 1409. **See id.** at 9–11. He claims that the trial court used boilerplate language and did not cite specific testimony or state the reasons for its order. **See id.**

Our standard of review in dependency matters is well-established:

Generally, the standard of review in dependency cases is for an abuse of discretion insofar as the appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact and credibility determinations if

² Father's challenge is relatively narrow. He does not challenge the trial court's overall determination; rather, he challenges the trial court's application of the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure to the adjudicatory and dispositional proceedings. Notably, his requested relief is that this Court vacate the trial court's order and remand for the entry of proper findings, rather than seeking reversal based on the facts of the case. **See** Appellant's Brief, at 11, 14–15.

supported by the record, but need not accept the court's inferences or conclusions of law. To the extent the [] case involves questions pertaining to [] proper interpretation of statutes and the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure, our standard of review is *de novo* and our scope of review is plenary.

Interest of R.P., 344 A.3d 783, 787 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations omitted).

Under the Juvenile Act, a "dependent child" is a child who, *inter alia*, "is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 ("Definitions"). "A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian[,], or other custodian that places the health, safety[,], or welfare of the child at risk[.]" ***Id.*** The burden of proof is on the county agency, which must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child meets this statutory definition of dependency. ***See In Interest of J.M.***, 652 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 1995). Clear and convincing evidence is that which is "so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts at issue." ***Interest of S.D.***, 334 A.3d 919, 926 (Pa. Super. 2025), quoting ***Matter of C.R.S.***, 696 A.2d 840, 843 (Pa. Super. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). "The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care and control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete questions: whether the child presently is without proper parental care or control, and if so, whether such care and control are immediately available." ***In re D.A.***, 801 A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en

banc). “Proper parental care is defined as ‘that care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of the child and (2) at a minimum, is likely to prevent serious injury to the child.’” ***In the Matter of C.R.S.***, 696 A.2d at 845, quoting ***In Interest of Justin S.***, 592 A.2d 1192, 1200 (Pa. Super. 1988).

As noted, though the trial court made findings both on the record and in its written order, Father argues it did not comply with Rules 1408 and 1409 because its findings were not sufficiently specific or made with reference to the record.

Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 1408 (“Findings on Petition”) provides, in pertinent part, that:

The court shall enter findings, within seven days of hearing the evidence on the petition or accepting stipulated facts by the parties:

(a) by specifying which, if any, allegations in the petition were proved by clear and convincing evidence;

(b) as to whether the county agency has reasonably engaged in family finding as required pursuant to Rule 1149[.]

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1408(a), (b). The comment to the rule states that “[t]he court is to specify which allegations in the petition are the bases for the finding of dependency.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1408 cmt.

Rule 1409 (“Adjudication of Dependency and Court Order”) provides, in pertinent part, that:

(a) Adjudicating the Child Dependent. Once the court has made its findings under Rule 1408, the court shall enter an order whether the child is dependent.

(1) *Dependency.* If the court finds from clear and convincing evidence that the child is dependent, the court shall proceed to a dispositional hearing under Rule 1512.

* * *

(c) Court Order. The court shall include the following in its court order:

(1) A statement pursuant to subdivision (a):

(i) as to whether the court finds the child to be dependent from clear and convincing evidence;

(ii) including the specific factual findings that form the bases of the court's decision;

(iii) including any legal determinations made; and

(2) Any orders directing the removal of a child from the home or change in the current residential status, including:

(i) orders as to placement;

(ii) visitation; or

(iii) change in custody; and

(3) Any orders as to any aids in disposition that may assist in the preparation of the dispositional hearing, including orders regarding family finding.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1409(a)(1), (c)(1)–(3).³

³ The comment to Rule 1409 states that “[b]efore a court can find a child to be dependent, there must be clear and convincing evidence in support of the petition,” and the petitioner has the burden of proof. **See** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1409 cmt. The court is to apply this clear and convincing evidence standard rather than a best interest of the child standard. **See id.** “The court’s inquiry is to be comprehensive, and its findings are to be supported by specific findings of fact and a full discussion of the evidence.” **Id.** The court is, further, “to specify which allegations in the petition are the bases for the finding of dependency pursuant to Rule 1408.” **Id.**

In arguing that the trial court did not follow the requirements of Rules 1408 and 1409, Father cites exclusively the text of the written order, **see** Appellant's Brief, at 9–10, and fails to incorporate the trial court's statements on the record, which fully explain the basis for its decision and the facts upon which it based its conclusions. Read in conjunction with the trial court's statements on the record, the order satisfies the requirements of Rules 1408 and 1409.

The trial court made the following statements on the record:

I do find [O.O.]'s testimony credible[.]

* * *

I understand [C.A.]'s position, but [O.O.]'s testimony belies the fact that he wants to go back with [F]ather, because there was also testimony that he acknowledged the threats that [F]ather made towards his life and [O.O.]'s life, and, in fact, his own life, which is why it is abundantly clear to me that [] the [A]gency [has] met its burden by clear and convincing evidence to substantiate the allegations in the petition.

As to both [C]hildren, it is clear that the recommendations that have been made for [F]ather to follow through are reasonable in light of all facts and circumstances known to the [A]gency.

It is abundantly clear from [O.O.]'s testimony and the testimony of the [A]gency that there is a need for a psychological evaluation so that we can determine whether or not reunification is possible and so that we can get to the bottom of [F]ather's erratic behavior and his refusal to cooperate with reasonable requests for the protection and safety of his children.

So[,] the [c]ourt will order that these [C]hildren have been found, by clear and convincing evidence, to be without proper parental care and control.

N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 54–55.

Father suggests the trial court erred by saying only that it found clear and convincing evidence to substantiate the allegations in the petition because it does not specify which allegations it found to be substantiated. **See** Appellant's Brief, at 7 & n.1, 10. We disagree.

The scope of the petition in the instant case is limited. Only paragraphs 6 and 7 allege facts upon which a court might base a finding of dependency.⁴ These paragraphs allege, in sum and substance, that: (1) during the Agency's initial assessment, significant concerns arose regarding the safety and welfare of the Children; (2) disclosures were made of ongoing physical abuse in the home; (3) disclosures were made that the Children were fearful of returning to the home; (4) Father threatened to significantly harm the Children if they disclosed the abuse and refused to allow the Agency access to the Children; (5) Father said the Agency is "evil" and has refused to comply with its investigatory requests; (6) Father told the Agency he is attempting to abduct the family; and (7) Father has been observed to act in an erratic manner. **See** Dependency Petition, O.O., 2/2/26, at 4 ¶¶ (6), (7); Dependency Petition, C.A., 2/2/26, at 4 ¶¶ (6), (7). On the record, the trial court explicitly found evidence to support allegations (4), (5), and (7). Furthermore, by citing

⁴ Paragraphs 1–3 contain demographic information, which Father does not dispute. Paragraphs 4 and 9 simply assert that the Children are dependent, and that it is contrary to their health, safety, welfare, and best interests to remain with Father. Paragraph 5 alleges the Agency received a CPS report, which, even if the court had not found it to be substantiated, is not necessary for an adjudication of dependency. Finally, Paragraph 8 is a statement of prior court action which, again, Father does not dispute.

O.O.'s testimony, which it found credible, as the basis for its finding of clear and convincing evidence to substantiate the allegations in the petition, the trial court effectively incorporated that testimony, which indisputably substantiated allegations (1), (2), and (3). In its opinion, the trial court confirmed the basis for its reasoning and made an express finding that the Agency worker's testimony was credible, which was sufficient to substantiate allegation (6).

Thus, the trial court cites abundant evidence, with reference to the testimony of specific witnesses, to substantiate the only relevant allegations in the petition. These on-the-record findings and written findings in the order of adjudication more than satisfy the requirements of Rules 1408 and 1409. ***Cf., e.g., In re M.B.***, 101 A.3d 124, 128–29 (Pa. Super. 2014) (statements in court order adjudicating child dependent based upon clear and convincing evidence and stating it found facts to be as stated in dependency petition deemed sufficient to satisfy Rules 1408 and 1409, though “a more detailed set of findings would have been preferable;” no mention of more detailed findings placed on record by trial court). ***See also, e.g., Interest of K.V.T.***, 311 A.3d 613, at *5 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 28, 2023) (Table)⁵ (admitting trial court, in its on-the-record statements, “did not explicitly link its factual findings to the allegations in the petition,” but finding trial court did not violate Rule 1408 because “case was a relatively straightforward single[-]issue

⁵ ***See*** Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential memorandum decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).

dependency case,” and “[o]verall, the trial court clearly specified that it found by clear and convincing evidence the sole allegation set forth by CYS in its dependency petitions for the [c]hildren as required by Rule 1408”).

Second, Father argues that the trial court failed to include various terms and conditions of the disposition, which, he argues, “creates uncertainty and allows the Agency to supplement the order where it otherwise would not be able to.” **See** Appellant’s Brief, at 14. He acknowledges that the trial court “[c]ite[s] to specifics in evidence” in its Rule 1925(a) opinion but claims “those observations must be made within the [o]rder or on the record.” **See id.** Specifically, he argues that the trial court did not comply with Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure 1512(D) (“Court’s findings”) and 1515 (“Dispositional Order”). Again, we disagree.

Rule 1512(D) reads as follows:

(D) Court’s Findings. The court shall enter its findings and conclusions of law into the record and enter an order pursuant to Rule 1515.

(1) On the record in open court, the court shall state:

(a) its disposition;

(b) the reasons for its disposition;

(c) the terms, conditions, and limitations of the disposition;

(d) the name of any person or the name, type, category, or class of agency, licensed organization, or institution that shall provide care, shelter, and supervision of the child;

(e) whether any evaluations, tests, counseling, or treatments are necessary;

- (f) the permanency plan for the child;
 - (g) the services necessary to achieve the permanency plan;
 - (h) whether the county agency has reasonably satisfied the requirement of Rule 1149 regarding family finding, and if not, the findings and conclusions of the court on why the requirements have not been met by the county agency;
 - (i) any findings necessary to ensure the stability and appropriateness of the child's education, and when appropriate, the court shall appoint an educational decision maker pursuant to Rule 1147;
 - (j) any findings necessary to identify, monitor, and address the child's needs concerning health care and disability, if any, and if parental consent cannot be obtained, authorize evaluations and treatment needed; and
 - (k) a visitation schedule, including any limitations.
- (2) The court shall state on the record in open court or enter into the record through the dispositional order, findings pursuant to Rule 1514, if the child is placed.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1512(D).

Rule 1514 ("Dispositional Finding Before Removal From Home"), as referenced in Rule 1512, provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Required Findings. Prior to entering a dispositional order removing a child from the home, the court shall state on the record in open court the following specific findings:

- (1) Continuation of the child in the home would be contrary to the welfare, safety, or health of the child;
- (2) The child's placement is the least restrictive placement that meets the needs of the child, supported by reasons why there is no less restrictive alternative available;
- (3) If the child has a sibling who is subject to removal from the home, whether reasonable efforts were made prior to

the placement of the child to place the siblings together or whether such joint placement is contrary to the safety or well-being of the child or sibling;

(4) The county agency has reasonably satisfied the requirements of Rule 1149 regarding family finding;

(5) One of the following:

(i) Reasonable efforts were made prior to the placement of the child to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home, if the child has remained in the home pending such disposition; or

(ii) If preventive services were not offered due to the necessity for emergency placement, whether such lack of services was reasonable under the circumstances; or

(iii) If the court previously determined that reasonable efforts were not made to prevent the initial removal of the child from the home, whether reasonable efforts are under way to make it possible for the child to return home; and

(6) The county agency has provided a permanency plan and services pursuant to 67 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 7504; and

(7) If a potential kinship care resource has addressed the court as to the individual's qualifications, then whether the potential kinship care resource may receive notice of, or participate in, future hearings.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1514(a).

Rule 1515, which Father also cites, states, in pertinent part, that "[w]hen the court enters a disposition, the court shall issue a written order, which provides that the disposition is best suited to the safety, protection, and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child. The order shall include: (1) any findings pursuant to Rules 1512(D) and 1514." Pa.R.J.C.P. 1515(A).

The trial court's written order includes its findings that: clear and convincing evidence existed to substantiate the allegations set forth in the

petition; the agency has satisfied the requirements of Pa.R.J.C.P. 1149 regarding family finding, **see** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1512(D)(1)(h); to allow the Children to remain in the home was contrary to the Children's needs and welfare, **see** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1514(a)(1); reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal, **see id.** at (a)(5)(i); foster care was the least restrictive placement that met the needs of the Children, **see id.** at (a)(2); the current permanency plan for the Children was reunification, with a concurrent goal of adoption, **see** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1512 at (d)(1)(f); the agency was to utilize family finding and family group conferencing, **see** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1512(D)(1)(h); and the disposition was best suited to the protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the Children, **see** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1515(A). **See** Orders, 3/9/24. On the record in open court, the trial court endorsed the Agency's additional, specific recommendations regarding disposition. **See** N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 34–37. With regard to visitation, the Agency explained that visitation was originally supervised at the Agency, but, because of inappropriate interactions between Father and the Children, it was now to be held at his parenting skills program.⁶ **See id.** at 35–36; **see also** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1512(D)(1)(k). The Agency recommended that Father cooperate and comply with its requests,⁷ which it justified by explaining that it "tried

⁶ At the time of the hearing, O.O. was refusing visits. **See id.** at 36.

⁷ Specifically, the Agency asked that Father allow the Agency's workers into the home; attend hearings, agency meetings, and treatment plan meetings; *(Footnote Continued Next Page)*

numerous times to incorporate and engage [Father] without success,” that Father refused to talk to case workers appropriately, that he refused to provide case workers information, and that he said he did not have to comply with the Agency’s requests. **See** N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 34, 36; Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/26, at 16. The Agency also proposed Father participate in an anger management program to develop appropriate methods to channel his emotions, an evidence-based parenting program, and undergo a psychological evaluation. **See** N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 36–37; Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/26, at 16; **see also** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1512(d)(1)(e), (g). The trial court then explicitly adopted the Agency’s service recommendations. **See** N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 55. Thus, the trial court’s orders clearly included the Rule’s required findings.

Father is correct that the Agency did not recommend any evaluations of the Children; however, this was because they were doing very well academically and already had appointments scheduled for medical care. **See id.** at 37–38; Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/26, at 16, 17; **see also** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1512(D)(1)(i), (j). The Children were placed together in their foster home, so the trial court had no need to justify placement away from siblings. **See** N.T.

sign releases of information; and notify the Agency of any new residence or contact information. **See** N.T. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 36–37.


Adjudicatory and Dispositional Hearing, 3/9/26, at 34; **see also** Pa.R.J.C.P. 1514(a)(3).

Between the written order and the court's oral pronouncements justifying its order on the record, the trial court clearly satisfied the requirements of Rule 1515. The trial court also expressly addressed these issues in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. **See** Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/26, at 14–19.

For these reasons, we find that the trial court properly complied with Pa.R.J.C.P. 1408, 1409 and 1512, 1514, and 1515 in justifying its decision to adjudicate the Children dependent and impose disposition. The court thoroughly articulated the evidentiary basis on which it made its decision and the required findings.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Benjamin D. Kohler", is written over a horizontal line.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/01/2026